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What's Wrong with Computer-Generated Images of Perfection in
Advertising?
By Earl W. Spurgin
Reality, as usual, beats fiction out of sight. — Joseph Conrad
Computer technology has allowed advertisers to create fantastic images such as an
automobile perched at the top of an unreachable mountain, pieces of clothing moving of their
own volition throughout rooms, and dogs performing complicated dance moves. These fantastic
images, however, are not limited to inanimate objects and nonhuman animals. Often, advertisers
use computer technology to create images of humans. They create these images for pure comic
effect such as depicting two men with heads that are much too small for their bodies after an
encounter with headhunters, and for harmless dramatic effect such as depicting Martin Luther
King, Jr. delivering his "I Have a Dream" speech without an audience. Sometimes, however,
advertisers use computers to create human images that are problematic.1 I will call these
computer-generated images of perfection.2 Advertisers create these images by using computer
technology to remove unwanted traits from models or to generate entire human bodies. They are
images of either men or women that portray ideal human beauty, bodies, or looks.3
Advertisers' portrayals of such ideals are nothing new. For many years, they have used
impeccable models, often with athletic or ultrathin physiques, to portray such images. Moreover,
prior to computer technology, they used airbrushing to remove unwanted traits from those same
models. These methods raise many of the ethical concerns that are raised by computer- generated
images of perfection, and most of the points in this paper apply to these methods as well.
Nevertheless, I believe business ethicists should begin to pay considerable attention to the new
computer-generated images. They have become quite common and have made portrayals of
human ideals easier to produce, more prevalent, and more extreme. Undoubtedly, they will be
become more common in the future as technological advances continue.
For some time, business ethicists have debated the ethical status of advertising.'4 The
debate has centered around two main objections: advertising is deceptive and it violates the
autonomy of those subjected to it.5 Because of the new computer technology that either exists
today or will come to exist in the future, these objections should be considered anew by
examining two questions. First, do these objections effectively challenge computer-generated
images of perfection? Second, do computer-generated images of perfection give rise to new
issues that business ethicists must explore?
The purpose of this paper is to examine those questions. I will begin by explaining the
common objections against advertising and by demonstrating how critics might argue that those
objections apply to computer-generated images of perfection. Along the way, I will demonstrate
an ethically significant difference between computer-generated images of perfection and the
images in ordinary ads. The latter do not subject viewers to virtual realities as do the former.
Viewers must make purchasing choices even though they are often unaware of the virtual realities
to which they are subjected. I will argue that although critics might use this fact to apply the
common objections to the use of computer-generated images of perfection, the objections fail.
Finally, I will argue that despite surviving the common objections, the use of computer-generated
images of perfection is subject to an objection that it does not survive. It is an ethical objection
that is based on aesthetic considerations. Advertisers are ethically obligated to avoid certain
aesthetic results that are produced by computer-generated images of perfection.
I. The common objections and computer-generated images of perfection
The two most common objections to advertising are the deception objection6 the autonomy
objection.7 Neither effectively challenges computer-generated images of perfection.

Deception objection

According to the deception objection, an ad is unethical if it is deceptive. An ad is
deceptive if it makes a false or misleading claim about a material feature of the product such as
price, quantity, quality, or safety. We expect advertisers to portray their products in flattering
ways. When it comes to claims about material features, however, we justifiably expect the claims
to be truthful. Imagine the narrator of a car commercial making the following claims:
(1) This is the most exciting car you'll ever drive!
(2) The list price of this car is $23,995 and that includes air conditioning!
The first claim is exactly the kind of flattering portrayal we expect advertisers to make. One does
not feel deceived if the car turns out not to be the most exciting one ever drives. The second
claim, however, is about a material feature. We expect it to be truthful. If it is not, the ad is
unethical because of its deception.
Applying this objection to computer-generated images of perfection, however, is
complicated by the fact that they are not images of products, nor do they make any explicit claims
about the material features of products. To run the objection, one must appeal to implicit claims
about products. One could say that such images imply that viewers will look like the models in
the ads if the viewers use the products.
This application of the objection, however, is unconvincing. It is highly unlikely that
viewers actually believe the implicit claims that the objector must attribute to the ads. In a
different but related context, Waide makes the point in this way: "Most of us have enough insight
to see . . . that no particular toothpaste can make us sexy. . . . Since we can . . . see clearly what
the appeal of the ad is, we are usually not lacking in relevant information or deceived in any usual
sense.
Autonomy objection

The autonomy objection comes in two basic forms. The first focuses on specific choices
about products and the information consumers need to make those choices autonomously. To
make autonomous choices to purchase particular products, consumers must make rational
choices. Rational choices involve many things, but central among them is that the choices are
based on analyses of products' abilities to satisfy particular needs or wants. To contribute to
rational choices, advertising must provide consumers with information that is relevant for
completing such analyses. Relevant information primarily comprises information about the
material features of products such as price, quantity, operating capacities, and safety systems.
Advertising, however, often does not provide that kind of information adequately. Instead,
it coerces or manipulates consumers into making purchases by providing them irrelevant
information. Advertisers spend little time, if any, on the material features of products. They are
more likely to make psychological appeals to capture the attention of consumers and convince
them to make purchases. These appeals generally take the form of associating products with
deep-seated desires for such things as love, happiness, being a good parent, or being a good
citizen, or with athletes or celebrities whom consumers admire. The effect is that consumers are
moved by these psychological appeals rather than by the information that is necessary for them to
make autonomous choices to purchase products.
Instead of being concerned that advertising prevents consumers from making autonomous
choices to purchase products, proponents of the second form of the objection believe advertising
is a contributing factor in the failure of persons to achieve the necessary conditions for becoming
autonomous more generally. In order to become autonomous, persons must become critical
thinkers. They must develop the capacities to critically examine themselves, their own beliefs, the
institutions of which they are parts, the societies in which they live, the governments to which
they are subject, and the world around them. Persons develop these capacities only through effort
and encouragement.

Advertising, however, often discourages the development of these capacities. The last thing
advertisers want is consumers thinking too much about the information conveyed in ads. Instead,
they encourage consumers to accept things at face value rather than to subject them to critical
analysis. Moreover, they encourage consumers to look for quick fixes to any problems they may
encounter rather than subject those problems to the difficult and lengthy analysis that typically is
necessary to resolve them.
Applying the two forms of the autonomy objection to computer-generated images of
perfection is relatively simple. Ads that make use of such images often spend little, if any, time
on the material features of products. Since knowledge of these features is what consumers need in
order to make rational choices about products and the ability to make rational choices is an
integral part of making autonomous choices, advertising impedes consumers' abilities to make
autonomous choices. Likewise, ads that make use of such images teach persons to judge
themselves and others by appearances, to look for the solutions to problems in products, and to go
through life in an uncritical, accepting manner. Such ads reward the failure to develop skills in
critical analysis that are essential to autonomy. Autonomous persons examine their own actions,
the actions of others, and the activities of institutions with a critical eye. The type of advertising
at issue dulls that critical eye. In these ways, it contributes to the failure of persons to develop
autonomy.
Defenders of advertising, however, can respond to both forms of this objection. They can
argue that consumers are not coerced or manipulated into buying products for two reasons. First,
there is more information about material features of products available to consumers through
advertising and other sources than critics acknowledge. Advertising often conveys information
about the material features of products, and when it fails consumers need only consult
publications such as Consumer Reports or acquaintances who have used products they are
contemplating purchasing in order to discover such information. Second, critics use the term
"coercion" too loosely. Advertising lacks the kind of force that is necessary to qualify as
coercion. After all, advertisers do not kidnap, torture, or drug consumers. Defenders also can
argue that advertisers do not dull the critical evaluation skills of consumers through their use of
computer-generated images of perfection. Instead, they respect consumers by providing them
with what they want. Through their purchasing practices, consumers demonstrate that they want
the images that advertisers portray.
Ethical significance of computer-generated images of perfection

Even if critics of advertising can reply success- fully to the responses I have described,
however, the objections fail to capture what is ethically significant about computer-generated
images of perfection. These images are significantly different than those in ordinary ads. They
place consumers in virtual realities in which they must make choices.
Consider ordinary ads that contain no computer-generated images of any sort. They
provide viewers with images of things or events that exist, or did exist, independently of the
methods used to depict them. Imagine a car commercial that shows a car zooming along a
highway with a narrator extolling its virtues. The image is of an event that actually occurred. Had
there not been film in the camera at the time the cinematographer intended to capture the image,
the event still would have occurred.
This is not true, however, of ads that contain computer-generated images of perfection. The
images do not exist in the world independently of the means used to depict them. They exist only
in the virtual realities of the computer technology that produces them. The effect of this is
ethically problematic. Consumers are viewing images that exist only in computer technology, and
they are making choices based on those images.
This does not mean, however, that the use of computer-generated images in advertising
always raises an ethical problem. In many cases, such as when advertisers use computer
technology to depict comic images or to create dramatic effect, no ethical problem arises because

viewers are well aware of the virtual realities to which they are subjected. Viewers are well aware
that the afore- mentioned men with small heads do not exist independently of the means used to
produce the image. Only a very troubled viewer can seriously believe that an encounter with
headhunters can leave two men walking and talking with shrunken heads. It would be grossly
unfair to hold advertisers accountable for anticipating the irrationality of such people. Likewise,
when an advertiser dramatically demonstrates the importance of reaching an audience by
depicting Martin Luther King, Jr. delivering his "I Have a Dream" speech to an empty
Washington, D.C. mall area, viewers are, or, at least, should be, aware that the image exists only
in a virtual reality.
When it comes to computer-generated images of perfection, however, an ethical problem
arises because viewers are often unaware of the virtual realities to which they are subjected.
When advertisers use computer technology to remove unwanted traits from models, viewers have
no way of knowing that the removals have taken place. Likewise, as technology develops,
advertisers will become better able to generate images of entire models and viewers will have no
way of knowing that those images are not real.
Critics might accept my point here. If they do, however, they are likely to draw a quite
different conclusion from it. Instead of providing a defense of computer-generated images of
perfection against the common objections, they might argue, my point provides an excellent basis
for applying the common objections to those images.
Critics might run the deception objection by arguing that the virtual realities to which
viewers are subjected are the most deceptive creations possible. Since the purpose of them is to
depict unreal images that are indistinguishable from real images, the very point is to deceive
viewers. Unlike ordinary ads where it is often debatable whether advertisers intend to deceive,
here there is no such debate. The virtual realities are, by definition, intended to make the unreal
seem real.
This argument, however, is not much more effective than the previous application of the
deception objection. To consider the strongest case for the critic, suppose that one views an ad
that depicts a completely computer-generated model and one mistakes it for a real model.
Although the ad likely carries an implicit claim that one will look like the model if one uses the
product, one is highly unlikely to be deceived by it. Waide's claim still holds. Most people have
enough insight to see through the implicit claim and recognize that no product can satisfy such a
claim. Just because one does not recognize the computer-generated model in the ad does not
mean one is any more deceived about material facts than one is when the model is real. If one is
not deceived by implicit claims attached to real models, one is not deceived by implicit claims
attached to computer-generated models. If this argument holds for completely computergenerated models, it holds a fortiori for computer alterations of real models.
Consider how critics might run the autonomy objection. The capacity to make rational
choices is a necessary condition for autonomy. Since the virtual realities of computer-generated
images of perfection prevents consumers from making rational judgments, they prevent
consumers from being autonomous. In order to make rational judgments, one must be able to
distinguish real from unreal. When one cannot, one is not autonomous.9 The virtual realities in
question, however, are designed to prevent viewers from distinguishing real from unreal.
Perhaps this is best understood by imagining a doctor who is trying to help a patient make a
rational judgment about his lifestyle. The doctor has determined that the patient needs to quit
smoking, so she shows him a picture of his damaged lung alongside a picture of a normal, healthy
lung. The second picture shows what a lung of a typical nonsmoker looks like. This comparison
gives the patient the reality of his situation, and helps him to judge rationally his lifestyle.
Suppose, however, that the second picture is a computer-generated image of an absolutely perfect
lung that has suffered no ill- effects from the actual world. It shows how a lung would look
without any exposure to pollution, pollen, second-hand smoke, or any other factors in the actual
world that are beyond an individual's control. Obviously, the contrast between the picture of the

patient's lung and the computer-generated picture would be far more striking than the original
comparison. Since the patient likely would not know the difference, the computer-generated
picture may be very effective at obtaining the end that the doctor wants. It does not, however,
result in an autonomous decision on the patient's part should he quit smoking. Since the patient's
judgment about his lifestyle is not the result of an understanding of the real facts of his situation
in the world, his decision to quit smoking has been coerced by the doctor.10
Although this objection is interesting, it fails to defeat the use of computer-generated
images of perfection for two reasons. First, the fanciful settings of the virtual realities produced
by such images do not preclude viewers from making rational judgments. If it did, we would have
to alter dramatically many of the methods employed by philosophers. We ask ourselves and
others to make rational judgments in fanciful settings every time we employ a thought
experiment. In those thought experiments, it is often unclear what is real and what is unreal.
Descartes, for instance, asks one to consider the possibility that one's experiences are the result of
dreaming, and, later, the possibility that one's experiences are produced by an evil genius." In
both cases, Descartes asks one to make rational judgments about epistemological issues in what is
presumably, but, perhaps not, a fanciful world. Likewise, Putnam's "twin Earth" example is a
thought experiment in which one is asked to make judgments about metaphysical questions in a
fanciful world.11 Given that we make this demand as philosophers, it would be very odd to hold
the view that one cannot make rational decisions in a fanciful setting.
Second, computer-generated images of perfection produce virtual realities of a kind with
all sorts of virtual realities we encounter. Many of our entertainments such as movies and video
games are virtual realities. Because of the blur between news and entertainment, even news
programs often constitute virtual realities. We must treat all these virtual realities equally unless
there is some relevant difference between them. So, we must hold one of the following views:
(1) The virtual realities produced by computer-generated images of perfection cause no
problems for our autonomy because the others do not.
(2) The others cause problems for our autonomy because the virtual realities produced by
computer-generated images of perfection do.
If we hold the second, then computer-generated images of perfection are the least of our worries
about autonomy. The other sorts of virtual realities are so prevalent that we lack the conditions
necessary for autonomy without even considering the effects of computer-generated images of
perfection. So, assuming we are capable of autonomy, it is reasonable to hold the first view.
One might, however, try to argue that there is a relevant difference between the virtual
realities produced by computer-generated images of perfection and the other virtual realities to
which we are exposed. The former are forced on us because they are pervasive and often we are
unaware of them. One does not choose to be subjected to ads, but, rather, they are interspersed
throughout things and events one chooses to enjoy. Movies and video games, on the other hand,
are activities in which one chooses to participate.
This reply has two problems. First, there are many people who choose to be exposed to ads.
One need only consider the yearly discussions about Super Bowl ads that take place in offices,
factories, schools, and bars to see that this is so. Besides, one chooses to accept ads by
participating in events and things that have ads interspersed throughout them. If I truly wished to
reject the ads at Major League Baseball stadiums, then I would have to forgo watching games.
Second, many of the other types of virtual realities are forced on us in exactly the same way as
ads. The virtual realities of many news programs are an example. I watch news programs for the
news, but I often get something that is more akin to entertainment. In fact, I often do not know
exactly what I am getting.
If what I have argued so far is correct, the use of computer-generated images of perfection
survives the common objections against advertising. There is another objection, however, that I
believe it does not survive.

II. Advertisers' ethical obligation to avoid certain aesthetic results
Despite the stance that I have taken on the common objections against advertising and the
use of computer-generated images of perfection, I object to the use of such images. The problem
with them, I believe, lies in very different ethical terrain than the common objections address. The
problem is that advertisers are ethically obligated to avoid certain aesthetic results that are
produced by the use of computer-generated images of perfection. If I successfully defend this
objection, I will achieve two important goals. First, I will show why advertisers are ethically
obligated not to use computer-generated images of perfection. Second, I will avoid raising
difficulties with advertisers' use of computer technology to construct perfectly harmless types of
fanciful images. The objection attacks the use of computer- generated images of perfection but
not the use of computer-generated images generally.
Despite the considerable disagreement among philosophers and business ethicists over the
ethical principles that are the source of our obligations, there is agreement over one point that is
useful here. To say that person A is obligated to X means that A is required to bring about or
avoid certain results that are identified by X. Those results can be harm, practical matters, mental
states, or countless others. My ethical obligation to drive on the proper side of the road requires
me to avoid the harm that could result from driving on the wrong side of the road. My ethical
obligation to submit final grades on time requires me to avoid the practical difficulties that could
result for those who work in the registrar's office if I do not submit grades on time.
The troubles of former President Bill Clinton demonstrate the usefulness of thinking of
ethical obligations in this way. The ethical status of his affair is irrelevant here. The practical
problems his actions created for his political party, sup- porters, and friends, however,
demonstrate the broadness of the content of ethical obligations. Because of the support he had
received from many people, Clinton was obligated to avoid bringing about practical, political
problems for those people. His actions placed an undue burden on those who cared about and
supported him, as well as those who hoped to elect a Democratic successor to the Presidency. It
was ethically wrong for him to bring about those political problems for others.
The results that one is ethically obligated to bring about or avoid may be matters that fall
within the aesthetic realm.13 A person who owns a famous work of art, say, a Rembrandt, is
ethically obligated not to destroy it for pleasure.14 That person is ethically obligated to preserve
the work by properly maintaining it or selling it to someone who is willing to do so. A
commissioned artist is ethically obligated to bring about certain aesthetic results that satisfy the
terms of the agreement entered with the client. A man who supervises women is ethically
obligated not to display a Playboy centerfold collection on his office wall so as to avoid what
many of the women may find aesthetically distasteful.15
Likewise, the ethical obligations of advertisers require them to bring about or avoid certain
aesthetic results. Before fleshing out those aesthetic results, however, it is important to provided a
justification for the claim that advertisers have ethical obligations of the sort that I have in mind.
There are many ways one might go about providing such a justification, but I will approach the
problem by analogy.16
Often, we demand particular behavior from persons as the price for making use of certain
resources. We see that behavior as required by ethical obligations. Manufacturers use various
natural resources and we demand that they make efforts to hold the pollution that results from
their processes to acceptable limits. We may disagree over what those limits should be, some
manufacturers may not abide by them when we do agree, and we may not always enforce those
limits successfully, but most agree that manufacturers are ethically obligated to hold pollution to
some level or other.
Likewise, for using the various resources that go into making, printing, and airing ads, we
demand that advertisers behave in particular ways. We demand that they do not air ads that are
inappropriate for children during children's television programming, that they do not advertise

products that are intended for adults to children, and that they do not produce ads that cause harm
to various social goals such as equality among the races and sexes. None of this means that
advertisers always do as we demand, nor does it mean that we always enforce these demands with
law. Rather, it means that we see advertisers as ethically obligated to behave in certain ways
because of their use of a variety of resources.
The behavior that we exact from those who use certain resources is often aesthetic. Think
of a new suburban neighborhood carved out of a previously natural environment. Most would
agree that those in the neighborhood are ethically obligated to take various steps to achieve
certain aesthetic results.17 Imagine that the area previously contained many trees, shrubs, and
wildflowers. Now that the neighborhood is developed, there are none of those things. Those who
live there have produced a neighborhood comprising nothing but houses and concrete. To let the
area become a blight on the landscape in this way is ethically objectionable. Those who have
taken that resource are ethically obligated to provide some sort of aesthetic substitute. Although
they cannot completely replace the lost natural environment, they can mitigate the loss by, at the
very least, planting trees, shrubs, and flowers.
Obligations of this sort do not arise just from the use of tangible resources like land.
Imagine a teacher who is impeccably accurate about the course material. Unfortunately, all agree
that he is the most boring teacher imaginable. Even though he makes use of few tangible
resources, he makes use of the minds of the students.18 Although not tangible, these minds are
resources. Because of his use of resources, we demand that the teacher do more than get
everything right. He is ethically obligated to change aesthetically by being more interesting. If he
is unable or unwilling to make the required change, he is obligated to find another profession.
The obligation of advertisers that is relevant here is both aesthetic in general, like that of
those in the new neighborhood, and a matter of being interesting in particular, like that of the
teacher. Real people in ads are more interesting than computer-generated images of perfection.
Advertisers are obligated to portray the more interesting real people.
To understand why real people are more interesting than their analogues created using
computers, think of the actress Gillian Anderson who stars as Agent Scully in the television
program "The X-Files," and starred as Lily Bart in the feature film The House of Mirth. She is an
interesting person with interesting features. She is far more interesting than any image those who
create computer-generated images of perfection are likely to produce. She is shorter, not as thin,
does not have as high cheekbones, has a tiny mole on her upper lip, and the list could go on. The
creators of computer-generated images of perfection have in mind images that are far less
interesting than real people like Gillian Anderson.
Since real people are more interesting, advertisers are obligated to portray them rather than
computer-generated images of perfection. Advertisers make use of considerable resources, and
they make use of them profitably. W e can demand that they avoid the aesthetic results that come
with the use of computer-generated images of perfection. They are ethically obligated to be
interesting, and, to be so, they must avoid the use of computer-generated images of perfection.
III.

Some possible objections
Admittedly, the position that I am taking here is rather controversial. Others are likely to
raise many objections to it. I will address three possible objections here.
Objection 1

One might agree that the computer-generated images of perfection produced today are less
interesting than real people, but object that this does not mean advertisers are obligated not to
produce them. Instead, advertisers are obligated to take the time to add the various features that
would make computer-generated images of perfection just as interesting as real people. They
could make some images short and some tall, some thin and some hefty, some with moles and
some without, and so on. If we make it clear what we find interesting, then advertisers are sure to

provide it.
Such a view, however, is overly optimistic for two reasons. First, the means for us to
demonstrate what we find interesting are few. When the opportunities arise, we can use our
purchasing powers to provide advertisers with such information. So many advertisers use
computer-generated images of perfection, however, that we rarely have the opportunity to support
those who do not. Also, since often we do not even know when such images are being used, we
cannot object to them through our purchasing practices. Remember, the very point of computergenerated images of perfection is to make us believe the images are real.
Second, creators of computer-generated images of perfection are unlikely to produce
images that have the "flaws" of real people that make them interesting when the point is to
remove those "flaws" in the first place. Remember, my objection to computer-generated images is
directed toward images of perfection alone. Advertisers create all sorts of computer- generated
images of people that are interesting and harmless. Images of perfection, however, are produced
so that the models lack interesting features that the creators view as "flaws." Many of the features
that make Gillian Anderson interesting are "flaws" when compared to the visions that the creators
of computer-generated images of perfection have in mind.
Objection 2

One might also object to my claim that real people are more interesting than computergenerated images of perfection. Although it might express my aesthetic sensibilities, it does not
express the aesthetic sensibilities of all people. In fact, there are likely to be people who think the
computer-generated images are more interesting than real people.
This objection is unconvincing for two reasons. First, those who find computer-generated
images of perfection more interesting are like those who find a neighborhood comprising nothing
but concrete and houses more interesting than one comprising those things along with trees,
shrubs, and flowers. Certainly, such people exist. They are, however, a small group. Their view
should not drive our ethical obligations. We should demand aesthetic results in the neighborhood
that differ from the view of the small number of persons who prefer only concrete and houses.
Likewise, we should demand aesthetic results in advertising that differ from the view of the small
number of people who prefer computer-generated images of perfection.
Second, what one finds interesting is affected by the images to which one is exposed.
Consider the phenomenon many encounter when reading a novel or seeing a film for the second
time. During the second reading or viewing, one often is able to recognize many subtleties that
one does not recognize the first time. A similar phenomenon often occurs when people begin
studying a new field. The first time one is exposed to a work of, say, philosophy, one might find
it incredibly difficult to glean anything of interest from the work. Often, however, familiarity
breeds interest. As one reads more works of philosophy, one learns to find things of interest in the
works. Likewise, the more one is exposed to images of real people rather than computergenerated images of perfection, the more one learns to identify what is interesting about them.
Objection 3
One might object that many advertisers see their creations as art and that my position is a
kind of censorship of their art. If they are obligated to bring about certain aesthetic ends, then
their creativity is censored. The creator of a computer- generated image of perfection may see that
image as a work of art that the creator should be free, without ethical restraint, to produce.
This objection is based on two views that I accept. I agree with the claim that art should not
be censored. I also accept the view that the images of advertising are often works of art. Many of
them are interesting, beautiful, and thought-provoking. Although I accept these two views on
which the objection is based, I do not believe that it defeats my position for two reasons.
First, I do not advocate government intervention to impose the ethical obligation that I
advocate. Second, the fact that something is a work of art and should not be censored does mean

there are no ethical restrictions on how and where it should be displayed. Graffiti is often art, but
that fact does not justify the creator displaying it on property that the creator does not own
without permission of the owner. The art world contains many disturbing images that parents
justifiably do not want their children to see. The fact that they are works of art does not justify the
artists displaying them in elementary schools. On the other hand, we do not prevent the
production of such images. To do so would be censorship. Instead, we make demands about
where they can be displayed. We demand that the graffiti artist create images only in those places
where permission has been granted. We demand that the disturbing images be placed in museums
and galleries so that parents have the ability to choose whether their children are exposed to them.
Likewise, advertisers are free to create any kind of images they wish. They have the option to
display them in many places. This does not, mean, however, that we can make no demands on
what they display through the various media. They are making use of resources. We can make
certain demands in return for the use of those resources.

IV. Concluding remarks
If what I have argued is correct, advertisers' use of computer-generated images of
perfection survive the deception and autonomy objections that are commonly levied against
advertising. Despite that, however, their use of such images is ethically objectionable. The
problem lies in the aesthetic nature of those images. The images simply are not as interesting as
images of real people, and advertisers are obligated to use the more interesting images.
Three important points should be noted in closing. First, although the use of real people is
likely to capture the attention of more viewers and result in more sales, that is not why advertisers
are obligated to use them instead of computer-generated images of perfection. The obligation
results from demands that we reason- ably can make given their use of certain resources.
Second, although I have not raised an objection to the use of images of perfection that are
not computer-generated, it does not mean that there are no ethical problems with such images.
Since there is extensive literature on such images, I have chosen to focus on what I find to be a
problematic technological development. With respect to those images, I hope that advertisers will
heed the warnings sounded by other philosophers and business ethicists and find other ways to
attract our attention and sell products.
Third, my objection to computer-generated images of perfection does not apply to other
types of computer-generated images used by advertisers. Most of the fantastic images depicted
with the help of computer technology are unobjectionable. Such images are often harmless and
effective because they make good use of humor and drama. In fact, such images are so effective
that it is unclear why advertisers feel the need to use computer-generated images of perfection.
My hope is that advertisers will continue to produce the harmless types of computer-generated
images and use them to replace computer- generated images of perfection.

Notes
Advancements in computer technology have added new dimensions to the ethical issues of virtually
every area of business they have touched. For a nice discussion of these added dimensions, see DeGeorge
(2000).
2 For a related concept, see Bishop (2000). As a category of advertising images. Bishop's "self-identity
image ads" include, but are not exhausted by, what I refer to as "computer-generated images of perfection."
3 Many of those who have addressed related images have focused on the effects they have on women.
Although I do not mean to minimize the importance of those effects, I will not limit my discussion to them.
For a good starting point to examine those effects, see Bishop (2000) and Peterson (1987).
4 There is an abundance of literature that relates, either directly or indirectly, to computer-generated
images of perfection. See Arrington (1982), Attas (1999), Beauchamp (1984), Bishop (2000), Camenisch
(1991), Carson et al. (1985), Crisp (1987), Hare (1984), Hyman and Tansey (1990), Jackson (1990), Lippke
(1989 and 1999), Machan (1987), Paine (1984), Peterson (1987), B. Phillips (1997), M. Phillips (1994),
1

Santilli (1983), Sneddon (2001), and Waide (1987).
5 These are not the only objections that have been made, but the others tend to work in connection with
either deception or autonomy. For example, some have charged that advertising is manipulative, but either
it is so because it deceives or in being so it violates autonomy. For some examinations of the manipulation
charge, see Arrington (1982), Beauchamp (1984), Crisp (1987), Hare (1984), Lippke (1999), and M.
Phillips (1994).
6 For some examinations of this objection, see Attas (1999), Carson et al. (1985), Jackson (1990), and
Machan (1987).
7 For some examinations of this objection, see Arrington (1982), Bishop (2000), Camenisch (1991),
Crisp (1987), Lippke (1989), Sneddon (2001), and Waide (1987).
8 Waide (1987, p. 74).
9 This point is recognized in our judicial system. The insane are treated in special ways in that system
precisely because they are not autonomous.
10 One might argue that since the patient likely is suffering from an addiction, the doctor is right to use
coercion to help him regain his autonomy.
11 For his explanation of those thought experiments, see Descartes (1977, pp. 308-311).
12 For his explanation of this example, see Putnam (1975, p. 223).
13 Ethical analysis of the aesthetic realm is complex and often controversial. For a nice survey of the issues
in recent literature, see Carroll (2000).
14 I do not mean to imply that there is universal agreement about the position that I take on this example or
those that follow, but, rather, that most would agree with my position on at least one of the examples.
15 Such a man may be guilty of sexual harassment as well, but it is beyond my purposes here to examine
that possibility.
16 Although my approach has many affinities with the approaches of those who apply social contract
theory to business ethics, that is not what I have mind here. For examinations of those approaches, see
Conroy (1995), Donaldson (1982), Donaldson and Dunfee (1994 and 1999), Douglas (2000), Hodapp
(1990), Husted (1999), Keeley (1995), and Rowan (1997).
17 Some might argue that the very construction of the neighborhood in such a place is ethically wrong.
Although that position raises many important issues, I cannot address them here.
18 I am using the term "minds" loosely here. I do not intend to beg any questions about the metaphys- ical
issues surrounding the mind/body problem.
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